

16 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison
Naval Aide to the President

Herewith at long last is a unanimously agreed upon analysis and recommendations of Gordon Gray's report which you send me at the direction of the President.

I suggest that this analysis be sent to Mr. Staats of the Bureau of the Budget for any additional comments which might be pertinent. I have talked this over with Staats and this would render unnecessary a rather lengthy and similar analysis on which the Budget Bureau has been working.

SIGNED

WALTER B. SMITH

Enclosure

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16 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In compliance with your instructions there is submitted herewith a general analysis of the report of Mr. Gordon Gray to you dated 22 February 1952, on the organization and work of the Psychological Strategy Board. This report with its conclusions and recommendations is concurred in by the three members of the Board.

In his analysis Mr. Gray reviews the events of the past few years which led to the creation of this new instrument of Government and traces the development and work of the Board since its inception. In addition, Mr. Gray has outlined the progress which has been made in resolving problems arising from the differences among the Government agencies concerned and in obtaining a concerted psychological effort.

The Board concurs that the report should not be published.

In suggesting publication, Mr. Gray was undoubtedly motivated by the desire to obtain better public comprehension of the Government's psychological warfare efforts and to enlist public support in the solution of the problems involved. The merit of these suggestions

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is fully appreciated but the clear disadvantages from the disclosure of the sensitive and classified material in the report amply justify your decision not to publish it.

On the other hand, from its study of the report and in light of the present world situation, the Board feels that it would be helpful if at an appropriate opportunity you chose to restate to the country and to the world the principles and policies guiding our psychological effort in the cold war as well as the problems that are faced and the work that has so far been accomplished, including possible reference to the Board's relation to that work. Such a statement might elaborate upon certain of the most significant themes of Mr. Gray's report. It would provide an opportunity to clarify the thinking of certain segments of the American public and of our allies, who may not yet be fully persuaded of the scope and vigorous nature of American policy with respect to the cold war. This would do much to accomplish what we believe to have been Mr. Gray's objectives in suggesting publication of the report. It would also provide an opportunity for you publicly to acknowledge Mr. Gray's contribution to the work of the Board.

Mr. Gray has suggested four specific changes affecting the Board. These are:

First, that the Director be made Chairman of the Board, possibly without a vote.

The title Director indicates a somewhat higher level of responsibility than was originally contemplated when the office was first

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created and the scope of the Director's duties has sometimes been misunderstood and deserves some clarification. However, the Director now sits with the Board, and as all proceedings are rather informal and decisions are based on unanimity of opinion, we believe on balance that no change in the composition of the Board need be made at this time. Arrangements have been made to rotate the duty of presiding officer, and for the Director to take his turn in that capacity. This will accomplish to some extent the purpose of Mr. Gray's recommendation, without conjuring up the objections which a more radical change might arouse.

Mr. Gray's second and third suggested changes contemplated that the Director sit with the National Security Council as needed, and that he informally report to the President at regular intervals. The latter suggestion involves your personal views and preferences. As to the former the Council has a tendency to grow, and you have had to trim it down once or twice already. Mr. Gray's purpose would be accomplished if the Director attended Council meetings as required and pursuant to invitation by the Council's Executive Secretary.

Mr. Gray's fourth proposed change is that a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should sit with the Board. Having one of the Joint Chiefs or its Chairman attend the Board meetings as a consultant and military advisor would simply be a strengthening of the representation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prescribed in your directive of 4 April 1951 organizing the Board. If you approve this suggestion,

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it may be accomplished by invitation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the needs of the Board require.

RECOMMENDATIONS

You have already taken the recommended action as regards non-publication of the report.

With respect to the other suggestions in Mr. Gray's report, the Board respectfully recommends that: (a) no change in organization be made at this time; (b) the Chairmanship of the Board be rotated with the Director taking his turn as presiding officer; (c) the Director be called on to attend National Security Council meetings as the needs of the Council require and at the invitation of the Executive Secretary to the Council; and (d) you indicate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff your approval of having the Chairman, or one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meet with the Board as a consultant and military advisor as the need arises.

SIGNED,

WALTER B. SMITH
Chairman
Psychological Strategy Board

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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

We face today one of the great convulsions of history. The world in which we live is being changed by strong currents of thought and feeling — currents released by the American and French Revolutions in the 18th Century, by the Industrial Revolution in the 19th and by two destructive wars and the Russian Revolution in our own time. This is no longer the world into which most of us were born. We may be sure that it will be a far different world before we die.

In this time of crisis and stress, the American nation has risen to a new role. We may speak of this role without vanity or self-consciousness because we did not seek it but rather tried to avoid it. Our role, as we have now expressed it in our national policies, is to help lead the nations through this time of turmoil in such a way that in the end there shall be an expansion — not a reduction — of the areas of freedom and knowledge. Expressed in another way, our role is to build a bridge over the abyss of confusion and frustration so that humanity may safely cross. If we can succeed in this role, the peoples of the world may be spared the sacrifice of human life and achievement which accompanied other great convulsions of history, and each nation may find release for its energies and genius in an era of peace and human dignity.

It will not be easy for us to play this role. For apart from the natural flow of historical forces, we know that the leaders of another great power have determined to exploit the trials of this period to the full. Years ago the men in the Kremlin sensed the approach of this turning point in human affairs. Today they are working, scheming, to intensify the strains, compound the chaos and ride the currents of nationalism, social unrest and despair to their ultimate goal of a world serving the ends of the Kremlin. Their strategy might be condensed into three words: *ruin and rule*.

Our reaction to this drive for world power was slow, but when it came, it took the form of an idea. This idea — at first expressed in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan — was basically as simple as this: America will help those who, believing in freedom, help themselves and help each other. Behind the force of this idea we put our economic and industrial strength. To the countries which showed a will to survive and to cooperate, we sent food, machines to grow more food, and still more machines to produce everything from shoes to electricity. We sent them our technical experts to raise production in their factories and on their farms,

to drain swamps, to dam rivers, to drive out malaria and other diseases, to teach the three r's. When the allies and dupes of the Kremlin spread lies about this effort, we launched a campaign of truth over the airwaves, in newspapers, in films, in public meetings. Then we helped our friends in the free world to raise a defensive shield over this peaceful effort.

Our economic help, our information program, our defense effort — if wisely used — are indispensable parts of the American program for bridging this period of upheaval. But the relentless assault of the Kremlin upon the bridge has demonstrated the need of another element. This missing element is an integrated psychological strategy.

There are practical and compelling reasons why we should make the fullest use of our resources in ideas and imagination, why we should make certain that all our sacrifices are directed toward the attainment of clearly defined ends. We must think in terms of preserving our country's economic, as well as moral, fiber in order to continue successfully our role of leadership.

Our aim is peace — not war. Though a protective shield is necessary to peace in a world threatened with war, we cannot indefinitely pour out our resources for economic and military aid, and preserve our own strength. We must use our ingenuity to find less costly means to produce situations of strength which will reduce the possibilities of war and simultaneously serve to shorten the present conflict.

In doing so, we must make it clear to those who are our friends, and to those who would be our friends, that we not only abhor militaristic imperialism, but also that we disclaim cultural and intellectual imperialism as well. The only rule we seek is the Golden Rule.

THE BACKGROUND

Toward the end of the first World War, a Russian revolutionary leader conceived the idea of a kind of struggle which would be "neither war nor peace." That leader was later disposed of by his less inventive comrades, but they eventually found merit in his idea and resolved to adopt it to the convulsive situation which would follow the second World War. Today the world knows the meaning of their choice -- an assault which stops short of general war, carried out under the cloak of an unnatural peace.

That assault began, in fact, before the second World War was over. As the armies of the Western Allies advanced, the forces of international Communism set to work in their rear to poison the minds of the liberated against the liberators, to turn the free nations against each other, to seize positions of power, and to break down the prestige of the United States. And while the victorious nations of the West were disbanding their armed forces, the Kremlin's men in every country were moving to battle stations in preparation for the "final struggle" so long foretold in Communist song and fable.

In blaming ourselves for what came after, we often overlook the fact that the leaders of Bolshevism had been training themselves in this kind of combat for a good half-century. Within their own country, they had graduated from the hard school of conspiracy and revolution. After their seizure of power in Russia, their institutes of political warfare had schooled foreign fanatics in the techniques of infiltration, subversion and the conquest of power. Throughout the world they had built up networks of agents who would move at the word of command to carry out an assassination or foment a civil war. Urban
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There was no great element of genius in the Kremlin's effort, but that effort had mass and momentum and a fanatical persistence. And although Communism had lost much of its power to convert, the Soviets still retained ample power to confuse. The classic rule of imperialism, "Divide and conquer" guided much of what they did. Nation against nation, race against race, man against man -- this was their stock in trade. They knew, of course, how to take advantage of man's vices, but they found it just as profitable to appeal to man's virtues. They twisted honest labor, [shook down timid employers], lured uneasy churchmen into furthering their strategy of confusion. They even found a way to use the word "peace" as a weapon of assault. Urban
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The advantage in warfare accrues to the aggressor. In the disillusionment, the weariness, the confusion of the post-war world,

the forces of Communism advanced confidently toward the ultimate goal set by the Soviet leaders -- a world responsive to the Kremlin.

Inevitably the leadership of the assaulted peoples imposed itself upon the United States, for we were the one great power which had come out of the war with reserves of moral and material strength. But by temperament and by tradition we Americans were ill-fitted for this kind of struggle. We fight were the way we play football. We want to win, tear up the goal posts and then go home. We found it hard in 1945 -- we find it hard today -- to comprehend that peace may be made an extension of war by other means. We called back our fighting men and returned them to their homes, thus exposing Europe and Asia to Soviet blackmail. We all but dismantled our wartime information services, thus opening the world to the Soviet lie. As a nation we tried to reverse time and rediscover the peaceful existence of the years before the war. Kear

Thus nearly two years passed before we began to face up to the responsibility of leadership which had come upon us.

When we did react, we moved one step at a time. First we pledged our support to Greece and Turkey, two nations which were holding the gates of the Near East in the face of increasing pressure from Communism. Then, when the Kremlin strategists shifted the weight of the Communist assault to Western Europe, we launched the Marshall Plan and brought together 16 nations to work for European recovery. With the aid of these nations we set Western Germany on the road to rehabilitation, and when the Soviets set siege to the free city of Berlin, we and our British allies improvised the airlift and saved that outpost of freedom. Next we moved to the aid of Yugoslavia, whose government had defied the Kremlin, and we were successful to this extent in rolling back the iron curtain. In the following years, together with our European allies, we began to raise a protective shield over the work of recovery. U.S.

Though we had started out without a long-range plan or blueprint, the net result of all these efforts was a solid piece of construction. A wall against Communist aggression was erected from the Black Sea to the North Cape of Norway. Even more important for the long run, we and our allies had set great ideas in motion -- the ideas of the Atlantic Community, of European Union, of a coal-steel pool for Western Europe, and of a European army. → H

Balked in Europe and the Near East, the Communist strategists turned the main focus of their assault to Asia. Even there, where human misery was great and the old order in decay, the power of Communism as an idea had to be backed by the force of arms and a spurious appeal to nationalism. The Chinese Communist armies advanced

across China until they had conquered the mainland and stood at the gates of Southeast Asia. At the same time, Communist forces, ranging from guerrilla bands to mass armies, brought terror to Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines.

Then the North Korean Communists launched an open attack upon the Republic of Korea, a ward of the United Nations. This was a challenge to the United States in the first instance and to the free world as a whole. If it had not been squarely faced, it would have opened the floodgates of disaster in Asia. But the United States faced it, and, backed by the United Nations, repulsed the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists who had joined them. This military success may well have been a turning point. It was supplemented by a great diplomatic achievement in the face of determined Soviet opposition — the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan which restored that bay nation of Asia to the community of nations.

So in the five years which followed the second World War we could look back upon some successes and some failures. We could also look forward to further — and possibly greater — trials. Our economic and defense programs, pursued in cooperation with our friends, were restoring economic health and raising confidence that peace could be maintained. Yet, at the same time, they were causing misgivings in many parts of the world because they seemed to some people to be manifestations of a new imperialism. In fact, the "reservoir of goodwill" for the United States which had existed in many countries was being seriously depleted.

THE ORIGINS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Early in 1951 a feeling developed within the U. S. government that we had to do more than we had done in the past to win and hold the confidence of our friends abroad and weaken the will of our enemies.

This feeling was the result of an evolutionary process. In the departments and agencies of the government a great deal of reflection had been given to the lessons we had learned in the struggle and a general desire had developed to concert our efforts to better effect.

In the years which followed the war, a number of committees had been set up to coordinate the work of different departments and agencies in the information and propaganda fields. These committees had no authority, however, to deal with matters of broad policy or strategy. They could not, for example, challenge decisions which might be economically or militarily sound but psychologically harmful. They worked some distance below the top in the chain of leadership and had little influence on policies and decisions. No committee or agency had the power to develop broad strategic ideas which would bring forth the highest capabilities of all agencies of government.

Furthermore, there was a diffusion of national power among departments, conscious of traditional compartmentation of interests and authority and on guard against intrusion in affairs felt to be their exclusive concern. The interdepartmental difficulties and lack of unified leadership denied to the United States the full value and impact of her bold acts in recent years.

But what was the answer to the problem? Was it possible to develop a strategic concept which would put more order and drive into all phases of our effort? And could we present our policies and acts in such a light that they would strike a responsive chord in the hearts and souls of men and make them feel that their cause was our cause?

In seeking an answer to questions like these, some high officials became convinced that we needed the same kind of unified leadership as in a military struggle. Accordingly, they proposed the appointment of a sort of "chief of staff for the cold war" responsible directly to the President and Commander-in-Chief. This chief of staff, with an advisory board of high-level officials, would work out the broad strategy, fix objectives and priorities, decide the role of each government agency and direct the over-all national effort.

Others in the government found this proposal too radical. They believed there were sound reasons for the roles which tradition and the statutes had assigned to each government agency. In their opinion, the insertion of a "chief of staff" between the President and the departments would be a needless complication, would probably do harm to our system of government, and would give a verlike cast to a peaceful mission. They suggested that a coordinating mechanism high up in the chain of command or perhaps in one of the major departments might produce a more effective national effort.

The directive which the President issued on April 4, 1951, was something of a compromise between these views. It did not appoint a chief of staff for the national psychological effort, but it did order some of the highest officers of the government to provide for "the more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations."

To accomplish this purpose, the President directed that the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should serve as a Psychological Strategy Board. Under them there would be a Director appointed by the President. The Director would have a permanent staff to help him carry out his responsibilities. A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would sit with the Board as its principal military adviser.

The President's order made the Board responsible for the "formulation and promulgation...of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort." It was to report to the National Security Council on its own activities and on the activities of all agencies engaged in the effort to influence men's minds [and wills].

This was a broad mandate. In setting "over-all national psychological objectives," the Board would identify [exactly] what we were trying to accomplish. Then it would draw up policies and programs to achieve those objectives. It would bring together all the government agencies which could play a part in such programs and find out what they could contribute. It would follow through and make sure that all the agencies were working together and doing their part. It would constantly study the progress of these programs to influence other people in favor of our work for peace and freedom. It would report to the National Security Council on these programs and the over-all effort in the field of psychological strategy.

The Board would have an acute realization that every significant action in the field of foreign affairs by any governmental agency has an effect upon the minds and wills of men. To maximize that effect the government must act in its different spheres according to a common plan which relates all actions together. - Kew

The President's directive did not put the Board into the field of operations. The Board would not, for example, manage the Voice of America or any of the information offices which the government had set up in other countries. It was to be a high-level group working in the field of broad strategy and coordination.

The first Director went to work on July 2, 1951. The Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency lent him enough help to set up the nucleus of a staff. This staff was organized in this way:

1. An Office of Plans and Policy. This staff group works on broad strategic problems, defines the objectives which we should aim at in our psychological effort, and draws up, in cooperation with other agencies, the programs to achieve those objectives.
2. An Office of Coordination. This staff group helps tie together the efforts already under way in the psychological field and follows through on plans and programs approved by the Board.
3. An Office of Evaluation and Review. This staff group obtains from other agencies of the government the intelligence estimates which the staff needs for its work and prepares evaluations of the effectiveness of American psychological operations.
4. An Executive Office for administrative matters.

In recruiting the permanent staff the Director was handicapped at the start, not only by the normal difficulties of recruiting able men in the government, but also by the shortage of experts in psychological strategy and operations. Within the government there were able administrators and specialists for the normal problems of peace. In the armed services could be found many able officers trained in the arts of war. But nowhere within the De
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government — nor for that matter in the nation — was there any considerable number of men trained to cope with a situation which was "neither war nor peace." As we Americans had never dreamed of forcing this kind of conflict upon the world, we had made no preparations for it.

Page 5
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SOME MISCONCEPTIONS

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Perhaps more serious than any staffing difficulties was the lack of a body of thought on psychological strategy. Because of this there was a great deal of confusion regarding the role of the Board and its staff. Serious apprehensions developed in the minds of people in the established departments and agencies with regard to a possible surrender of traditional authority and responsibility. The result was that they viewed the creation of the Board with something less than unrestrained enthusiasm.

There were also many misconceptions which threatened to hamper the work of the Psychological Strategy Board. Perhaps the most widespread of these was the idea that the Board was to concern itself only with "word warfare". Those who believed this felt that the Board should confine its activity to explaining -- or explaining away -- the decisions or actions of our government in the foreign field. They denied that the Board should have any interest in the decisions or actions themselves. It had to wait until the government moved, and then, for the benefit of foreign peoples, it would put the best possible interpretation on the move. The diplomats would make the political decisions, the military would make the military decisions, the economists would make the economic decisions -- and the Board would make the best of it.

At the other extreme was the belief that the mandate of the Psychological Strategy Board covered just about everything -- everything from the decisions of the President to the hourly bulletins on the Voice of America. Those who favored this belief wanted the Board to be a super-agency which would make foreign policy, develop strategic programs to influence other nations, carry out propaganda operations, and in general have command authority over all government agencies.

A third major obstacle to the Board's early efforts was the deep-seated idea that it is impossible to plan an integrated strategy for our activities to influence the minds and wills of others. The officials who held this view contended that, because of constant international change, it was not practicable now wise to attempt to put down on paper an adequate statement of our policies and objectives in other parts of the world, which could serve as an accurate and dependable guide. It followed that we could not hope to draw up plans and programs to carry out our national policies and reach our objectives. The situation was much too fluid to permit this. We had to wait and see what our opponents were going to do; then we could improvise a response.

A fourth impediment to the Board's work was the contention that our intelligence from certain parts of the world was not precise enough to permit effective psychological planning and activity. *Dele*

A fifth was the idea that we could not risk a bold initiative to improve our position in any part of the world until we had completed our military build-up. In the minds of those who held this view, the sound concept of building "situations of strength" had become distorted to mean "situations of military strength." Until we had achieved military equality with, or preponderance over, the Soviet bloc, we could not do much to change the situation in the world to our advantage. *SPH*

A sixth was the contention that any kind of "strategic planning" must necessarily be military planning.

But perhaps the greatest misconception of all was the widespread impression that the struggle in which we are engaged is a "cold war" -- a remote conflict which may go on for ten, fifty or a hundred years without our being able to do very much to bring it to a successful conclusion.

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THE PSB CONCEPT

In the course of their work the Director and his staff reached a number of conclusions on these matters.

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In the first place, they quickly made up their minds that the Board's mandate covered a great deal more than word warfare. The task of the Board, they believed, was not to explain — or explain away — events but to help shape events. For this reason, they felt that the Board, though not primarily a policy-making body, should strive to obtain wise policies and develop sound programs which would establish an identity between our aims and those of other free nations.

On the other hand, the Director and staff did not accept the view that the Board should concern itself with "almost everything." They felt, particularly, that their instructions to stay out of operational matters were sound. As they saw it, if the Board became entangled in day-to-day decisions and tried to inter-vene in all fields of government activity, it would soon cease to be a strategy board and would become a "Board of Improvised Tactics."

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In the third place the Director and his staff became convinced that it not only is possible but imperative to plan our efforts to influence men's minds and wills. When a nation projects its budgetary outlays at the rate of \$200,000,000 or more a day, it can afford to make up its policies and programs as it goes along. And when it is facing a ruthless opponent who has given half a century of thought to this kind of conflict, it must buckle down to the grim business of trying to think ahead of him. In the opinion of the Director and his staff, the U.S. has the capacity to make plans which will retain the psychological initiative for the free world and pin down our opponents on the defensive.

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Fourthly the Director and his staff did not share the view that intelligence deficiencies rule out effective psychological activity. With ingenuity and imagination, they believed, such effective work can be undertaken on the basis of our present knowledge. Later, as our information improves, adjustments can be made in aims and methods.

In the fifth place, the Director and staff rejected the view that effective actions to rally our friends and confound our enemies must await the military build-up. They recalled that the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift and other successful programs had been carried out when we had barely one

effective fighting division in Europe. As they saw it, the task for psychological strategy was to help create situations of strength, not to wait for their creation.

Sixth, the Director and the staff recognized that military strategy is a matter for the military, and they welcomed military participation in the assessment of possible repercussions from our activities designed to influence the minds and wills of other peoples. But, they pointed out, we are in a struggle in which we hope that the application of military power will not be the decisive factor. Strategic planning must go forward on the broadest lines and include all elements of pressure and persuasion if we are to succeed in our national effort to preserve peace and extend freedom.

Finally, all the discussion within the staff pointed toward the conclusion that this is not a cold war but a war of wills. The term, cold war, which had been useful in arousing the American people five years ago, is harmful today because it conveys the impression of a remote, impersonal conflict which we are powerless to influence. The Director and his staff believed it is within our power to influence the course of this conflict. They believed that leadership could produce the will in the government, the Congress and the people to turn events in our favor and gradually strengthen the forces working for peace. Perhaps the greatest test and the major contribution, of the Psychological Strategy Board will be the development of such a collective will within the government.

These were some of the convictions which grew out of the work of the Director and his staff.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD TODAY

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By the end of 1951, a large part of the staff had been gathered. The Director had at his disposal an able and dedicated group of men and women from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Administration and from private enterprise. It was contemplated that the staff would remain small by governmental standards. Altogether it would number about seventy-five persons, including professional, clerical and administrative personnel.

The efforts of this staff were supplemented by panels of experts drawn from all the agencies of government and by consultants from the outside. These efforts covered a wide field, — plans for worldwide informational activity in connection with developments in Korea, a broad strategic concept for the war of attrition, a program for helping political fugitives from the iron curtain countries, an inventory of our resources for influencing men's minds and wills, a catalog of useful research projects in the social sciences. (A comprehensive list of projects completed or begun is given in the classified annexes.)

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As the work progressed the members of the Board developed a corporate spirit and a sense of purpose. Formal meetings to approve new projects and hear reports on projects already under way were held about every three weeks. Informal luncheon meetings were held every week for exchanges of views on the Board's problems. At the meetings each member of the Board came up with ideas for new activities and each member made his contribution to the reports which set new projects in motion.

Much spadework, of course, remains to be done. The first Director had to leave to his successor many problems of staff procedure and organization, as well as problems of policy and strategy. But it can be said that the Psychological Strategy Board is definitely a going concern. In a little more than half a year's time, the concept of combined operations, with all agencies of government concerting their efforts toward a common end, has gained ground. Much work which might not have been undertaken if there had been no Board has been started and some concrete results have been achieved. It still is too early to say whether the Board is the answer to the problem which it was designed to meet, but it has made a worthwhile start.

The experience to date, however, has suggested a number of changes which would strengthen the Board without essentially altering its structure.

1. The Director should be made Chairman of the Board, possibly without a vote. This is because the Director alone is giving his full attention to psychological strategy; the three members of the Board have other responsibilities which take much of their time and energy. As Chairman of the Board, the Director would be in a much stronger position to exercise the leadership which is needed.
2. The Director should sit with the National Security Council when it considers matters of interest to the Board. This would permit him to advise the Council on the psychological dangers or advantages of different lines of policy.
3. The Director should informally report to the President at regular intervals. Psychological strategy is — and must remain — an instrument of the President and Commander-in-Chief. Frequent talks with the Director would help the President make more effective use of an instrument which can be valuable to him, and would put the driving force of his leadership behind our national psychological effort.
4. The Chairman or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should sit with the Board as its military adviser. This would eliminate delays and misunderstandings which arise when a subordinate officer sits for the Joint Chiefs.

These changes would help the Board to do a better job. For the moment they appear to be all that is necessary. On the basis of the experience to date it does not appear desirable to give the Board a statutory base or to make other drastic modifications in its charter.

Nevertheless, it must be frankly recognized that a great deal more than the four adjustments recommended above will be needed to assure success in the war of wills.

The members of the Board must be determined to exercise their mandate vigorously and effectively and to make full use of the available resources. Just as important, the staffs of their

departments and of other agencies of government must be ready to participate in the Board work with a sense of the role of leadership which America is called upon to play. This is no time to let rivalries between agencies or the passion for the lowest common denominator in ideas determine the scope of our national effort.

If failures of this kind should prevent the Board from effectively discharging its mandate, it will be necessary to reconsider the possibility of setting up a more centralized direction of the national effort in the war of wills.

THE TASK AHEAD

The year 1952 is a year of decision.

In some parts of the world the situation may grow worse before it gets better. We must remember that the government of the second strongest power in the world is working tirelessly to make things worse wherever it can. It is working to permeate the world with a spirit of hopelessness, futility and desperation. It is working to turn men's hearts against us, to make men feel that we Americans are the real disturbers of the peace, that we are deliberately plotting a new war. It is using the armed force of its puppets and the threat of its own military power to accomplish what it could never hope to accomplish by the force of its ideas.

We must meet this challenge — but we must meet it in our own way. Basically, this is not a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union as nations. It is one of the great convulsions of history which a band of conspirators in the Kremlin is seeking to exploit for its own ends. Our role, as we have seen, is to lead the peoples who prize freedom through this period of convulsion so that each nation, in its own way, may be free to enrich our common heritage in an era of peace and human dignity.

This role of leadership cannot be met by unplanned improvisation. We must remember that in the field of international affairs no major decision or action can be taken by our government without some effect — favorable or unfavorable — on the hearts, the minds and the wills of men. Thus it is imperative that the policies we make, the plans we adopt, the acts we perform should be part of, and conform to, an enlightened psychological strategy designed to establish a community of interests in the differing aspirations of America and the peoples who have the will to be free.

Our role of leadership calls for the best in the character of the American people. It requires of our people a spirit of resolution, a willingness to sacrifice, an effort of understanding and a flow of generosity — generosity of the heart even more than generosity of the purse. Perhaps the truest psychological strategy is that we should so conduct ourselves as a nation that we shall appear worthy of the role of leadership which has come upon us.

Encl #3-60/122

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
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1. PROJECTS COMPLETED OR BEGUN
 - A. Office of Plans and Policy
 - B. Office of Coordination
 - C. Office of Evaluation and Review
 - D. Director's Staff
 - E. Executive Office
2. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE, APRIL 4, 1951
3. ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD UNDER 4/4/51
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

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ANNEX 1

A. OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY

1. Completed plan for psychological operations in the event of a break-off in the Korean armistice negotiations.
2. Completed plan for psychological operations in the event of success in the Korean armistice negotiations.
3. Completed report on problems arising in connection with the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea.
4. Completed guidance for overt propaganda in the event of general war.
5. Completed organizational plan for conducting psychological operations during general hostilities.
6. Completed inventory of resources available for psychological operations planning. Began study of resources available to counter Soviet bloc blackmail (such as the detention of the American flyers in Hungary).
7. Began analysis of National Security Council papers and other documents to determine our national aims, purposes and approved programs.
8. Completed psychological operations plan for the reduction of Communist power
9. Began psychological operations plan for the reduction of Communist power
10. Began

TOP SECRET

25X1

-3-

10. Began plan for release of publicity on atomic and other new weapons.

11. Began preliminary work on plan to undermine the Soviet position in Eastern Germany and fit a united Germany into a unified Europe.

12. Began preliminary work on plan to reduce Communist pressures in Japan and Southeast Asia.

13. In cooperation with other offices, started plan for psychological operations to exploit the strains and uncertainties among Communists arising from the eventuality of Stalin's death.

14. In cooperation with other offices began plan to derive maximum benefits from defection and disaffection of Soviet bloc nationals.

B. OFFICE OF COORDINATION

1. Established a pattern of relationships with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency and other Government offices.

2. Coordinated operational planning in execution of two plans covering Korean armistice contingencies (see A, 1 and 2).

3. Completed a report and recommendations on efforts already under way to reduce Communist strength [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This preceded preparation of long-range plans, see A, 8 and 9).

4. Completed

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-3-

4. Completed report and recommendations on the problem of defectors and refugees from Iron Curtain countries already in Western Europe (this preceded preparation of long-range plan, A, 14).

5. Began plan for psychological operations in the field of East-West trade.

6. Completed first stage of inquiry into social science research projects which might be useful in psychological strategy.

7. Began coordination with Voice of America

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8. Carried out coordinating and liaison activities connected with completed plans or plans in progress.

9. Began survey of United States overt foreign information programs in order to identify major problems.

10. Began development of procedures governing the Board's responsibility under NSC 10/5.

C. OFFICE OF EVALUATION AND REVIEW

1. Provided initial summary and analysis, with initial frame of reference, for inventory of resources available for psychological operations planning (see A, 6).

2. Prepared summary and analysis section, including intelligence support and analysis of existing situation in support of psychological operations plan for reduction of Communist strength (see A, 8).

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3. Prepared

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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-4-

3. Prepared summary and analysis section, including intelligence support and analysis of existing situation in [REDACTED] in support of the psychological operations plan for reduction of Communist strength [REDACTED] (see A, 9).

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4. Initiated preliminary work on plan to undermine Soviet position in Eastern Germany and fit a united Germany into a unified Europe; completed preliminary estimate of situation and began detailed summary and analysis in support of strategic planning project; contributed to establishment of terms of reference and strategic concept under which plan is being developed (see A, 11).

5. Initiated recommendation for preparation of a strategic plan for Japan; completed study on significant psychological factors in Japan; prepared initial recommendations as to scope and impact of Japanese Islands on Southeast Asia and other areas (see A, 12).

6. Contributed oral and written preliminary estimates for plan to reduce Communist pressures throughout Southeast Asia.

7. Began preparation of preliminary staff estimate of significant psychological factors in India with recommendation that it be considered for immediate action.

8. Assumed jointly with the Special Assistant to the Director responsibility for the plan for psychological operations to exploit strains and uncertainties among Communists arising from the eventuality of Stalin's death (see A, 13).

9. Initiated

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9. Initiated original Board action on plan for the exploitation of Soviet orbit escapees; prepared terms of reference; provided continuing intelligence and policy support for planning Phase A (see B, 14). Assumed responsibility for plan to derive maximum benefits from the defection of Soviet bloc nationals (see A, 14).

10. Prepared preliminary staff study of psychological situation in the Middle East with recommendations as to the terms of reference, scope, policy, and strategic concept within which planning should be conducted.

11. Initiated preliminary estimate of the situation, recommendations, and factual support for study of resources available to counter Soviet bloc blackmail (such as the detention of American fliers in Hungary).

12. Began evaluation of effectiveness of U.S.-U.K.-French disarmament proposal in the United Nations.

13. Completed staff study on methods and approaches for evaluating psychological situations and reviewing strategic plans.

14. Provided intelligence support, including daily oral briefings for all members of the staff and for all projects.

15. Prepared preliminary staff study with estimate and recommendations on problems and prospects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

16. Arranged

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-6-

16. Arranged indoctrination of staff members on functions and obligations of agencies concerned in psychological operations, including the arrangement of briefings by key members of those agencies for staff members.

17. Established procedures and relationships with other agencies to provide intelligence and policy support for PSB activities.

D. DIRECTOR'S STAFF

1. Began study of a broad strategic concept for the current struggle.

2. Maintained liaison with the National Security Council Senior Staff on reports in progress.

3. Initiated re-examination of adequacy of mechanisms for policies, planning and coordination in field of high-level, non-military deception.

E. EXECUTIVE OFFICE

1. Assisted the Director in developing a scheme of organization for the Staff.

2. Established permanent headquarters of the Board.

3. Worked out with member agencies the means of financing the operations of the Board, the procurement of supplies and equipment, and personnel policies.

4. Worked

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-7-

4. Worked out a table of organization including all staff positions.
5. Prepared a budget.
6. Provided administrative support for the Board, the Director, and the staff.

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